The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 44
Number 4 Parameters Winter 2014

Article 12

Winter 12-1-2014

The US Army's Domestic Strategy 1945-1965
Thomas Crosbie

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military History Commons, Military, War, and
Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas Crosbie, "The US Army's Domestic Strategy 1945-1965," Parameters 44, no. 4 (2014),
doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2974.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Civil-Military Relations &
Military Ethics

The US Army’s Domestic Strategy 1945-1965
Thomas Crosbie
© 2014 Thomas Crosbie

Abstract: Post-war drawdowns often include a re-negotiation of
the terms of civil-military relations. After World War II the US Army’s command culture was marked by Army Utopianism, an expansive vision of the Army’s place in American society. This article
sketches the history of Army Utopianism, noting its contribution to
failing strategies in Vietnam, and argues for greater attention to the
link between operational concerns and the Army’s domestic political strategy.
“To use—and restrain—its immense social, economic, and political influence wisely and
effectively, the Army must obviously hold itself in close rapport with the people.” - Russell
F. Weigley.1

T

he United States Army can boast a distinguished record of innovation during times of war, when rapid technological advances
have been matched by innovations in organizational structure,
principles of command, and logistics. But military organizational innovation does not end with the ceasefire. In the tense drawdown periods after
war, Army leaders are tasked with preserving lessons of past wars while
preparing for new challenges with shrinking budgets and fewer personnel. The drawdown period is thus a de facto re-negotiation of the terms of
civil-military relations, and accordingly it is a time when domestic political strategy is especially important.2 Since we find ourselves yet again in
such a moment of re-negotiation, we would do well to consider how
earlier attempts to guide the Army’s post-war relations with state and
society shaped the organization’s readiness when war finally came again.
In these moments of re-negotiation, Army leaders may be inclined to
agree with Russell F. Weigley that “the Army must obviously hold itself
in close rapport with the people.” What is not at all obvious is what Army
leaders should do to bring this about. While domestic political strategy,
the capacity to bring about such changes, is limited by law and custom,
there is a growing sense that the reality of domestic statecraft should

1      Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, Enlarged Edition (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1984), 556.
2      The term “domestic political strategy,” coined here, encompasses efforts to shape the domestic political environment. The concept is borrowed in part from Eliot A. Cohen, “Are U.S. Forces
Overstretched? Civil-Military Relations,” Orbis 41, no. 2 (1997): 177-186; and from Risa Brooks,
“Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies,” in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds.,
American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
2009). Domestic political strategy is not a pejorative term; much of this work is mandated by civilian authorities as a means of maintaining oversight. The congressional liaising done by Legislative
Affairs Officers is partly to keep members of Congress informed. Stephen K. Scroggs, Army
Relations with Congress: Thick Armor, Slow Horse (Westport CT: Praeger, 2000).
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be acknowledged openly in the current post-war defense conversation.3
For example, Charles D. Allen writes of the need for “senior leaders
who are strategic assets capable of ensuring relevance of the Army to the
nation,” a turn of phrase echoed in William G. Braun’s recent call for a
“relevancy narrative” to secure the Army’s fortunes despite the public’s
tendency to under-appreciate its peace-time military.4
As with any strategy, the Army’s domestic political strategy bears
the imprint of underlying attitudes and assumed meanings that form
the organization’s unique culture. Hints of how this is manifested in
the current drawdown negotiation have been noted by Braun and Allen
to “revert to a rhetoric dominated by the force sizing and prioritization mantra to ‘fight and win the Nation’s wars,’ with all other uses of
the military being ‘lesser-included’ capabilities.”5 These are not simple
calculations, as there are particular challenges associated with changing
the minds of top commanders on fundamental questions of this sort.6
However, the deeper risk is that, faced with navigating this vast institution through changing operational and political waters, Army leaders
will fall back on bad mental habits and lead the Army to fall ever further
out of step with the state and the American public.
What follows is a description of a “cultural structure,” or set of
institutionalized patterns, that arose during the post-World War II
drawdown and had negative consequences for the institution, contributing to an over-long investment in the failing strategies employed
in Vietnam.7 This was “Army Utopianism,” a vision of the Army as
a central structure of governance, one that was expected to connect
a large proportion of citizens to the state and to the world. This cultural structure is ultimately a manifestation of a deeper well of civic
republican thought in the American political tradition, reflecting in part
what Samuel P. Huntington would later praise as the “military ideal.”8
However, Army Utopianism can and should be analytically separated
from those concepts in order to pinpoint one specific way Army leaders
tended to envision civil-military relations at a transitional moment. The
existence of this set of assumptions led leaders to make poor decisions
that ultimately contributed to the profound alienation of millions of
Americans from the Army.
The first part of this article, will sketch the emergence of this cultural structure as it was expressed in internal Army documents. Army
3      The legal context is reviewed by Allen W. Palmer and Edward L. Carter, “The Smith-Mundt
Act’s Ban on Domestic Propaganda: An Analysis of the Cold War Statute Limiting Access to Public
Diplomacy,” Communication Law and Policy 11, no. 1 (2006): 1-34.
4      Charles D. Allen, “Assessing the Army Profession,” Parameters 41 (Autumn 2011): 73;
William G. Braun, III, “Op-Ed: Between Conflicts: An Army Roles that Sticks,” Strategic
Studies Institute, January 17 2014, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/
Between-Conflicts-An-Army-Role-That-Sticks/2014/01/17.
5      William G. Braun III and Charles D. Allen, “Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy:
Reconciling Military Roles,” Joint Force Quarterly 73, no. 2 (2014): 54.
6      Stephen J. Gerras and Leonard Wong, Changing Minds in the Army: Why It Is So Difficult and What
To Do About It (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2013).
7      John R. Hall, “Cultural Meanings and Cultural Structures in Historical Explanation,” History
and Theory 39, no. 3 (2000): 331-347.
8      Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1957). For a discussion of civic republicanism in American
civil-military relations, see Gary Schaub, Jr. and Adam Lowther, “Who Serves? The American AllVolunteer Force,” in Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in Perspective: Strategy, Structure and
Policy (London: Ashgate, 2012).
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Utopianism emerged as a consequence of the massive mobilization of
the country during World War II and was cultivated by some Army
leaders over the next three decades. The second part of the paper notes
the strategic significance of the cultural structure. Initially, it reflected
a major division in the newly-formed Department of Defense over the
role of conventional ground forces, and specifically President Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s New Look policies. Subsequently, when President John F.
Kennedy pivoted from New Look to an emphasis on irregular warfare
in the early days of American involvement in Vietnam, the Army was
again challenged to justify its special monopoly on conventional ground
forces. Together, these pressures led Army leaders to favor a form of
involvement in Vietnam that would prove politically disastrous.
As domestic US political will flagged following the Tet Offensive
of 1968, this structure was gradually rejected by Army leaders as an
impossible dream. New visions, giving rise to new political strategies,
emerged in its wake. By turning our attention to this fleeting cultural
structure, we can sensitize ourselves to one way the Army’s leaders failed
in the past to keep in close rapport with the public. This example should
serve as a reminder as a new generation of leaders attempt to navigate
the politics of drawdown and the desire for a peace dividend while also
undergoing the costly “Pacific pivot.”9 Then as now, the temptation to
strengthen civil-military relations by expanding the Army’s presence
in American public life may well lead to the opposite outcome. While
changing culture at any level can be difficult, this expansive, optimistic
element of the Army’s command culture should be recognized as posing
a real danger to its future relations with the public.

Utopianism as US Army Culture

Perhaps no figure was more influential in shaping the US Army’s
command culture during the mid-twentieth century than George C.
Marshall. Described as “the principal military architect of the Western
democracies’ ultimate victories over the Axis powers,” Marshall was
also considered by some “the most powerful figure in the government
after the president himself.”10 As such, he was responsible for setting the
tone of the Army’s domestic political strategy, influencing the development of Army utopianism.
A sense of Marshall’s preferred command style can be gleaned from
a commencement address at Trinity College on June 15, 1941:
This Army of ours already possesses a morale based on what we allude
to as the noblest aspirations of mankind—on the spiritual forces which
rule the world and will continue to do so. Let me call it the morale of
omnipotence. With your endorsement and support this omnipotent morale
will be sustained as long as the things of the spirit are stronger than the
things of earth.11

9      This has been described by Joseph S. Nye as “the great power shift of the 21st century.”
Joseph S. Nye, “Obama’s Pacific Pivot,” The Korea Herald, December 8, 2011. See also David A.
Beitelman, “America’s Pacific Pivot,” International Journal 67, no. 4 (2012): 1073-1094.
10      Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1984), 421; Ed Cray, General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman (New York: W.W.
Norton & Co., 1990), 402.
11      Marshall, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Volume 2: “We Cannot Delay,” July 1, 1939-December
6, 1941, ed. Larry I. Bland (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), 538.
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Things of the earth eclipsed things of the spirit more quickly than
Marshall would have hoped: while public support remained at “unprecedented levels” throughout the war, this quickly dried up after V-J
Day.12 At the same time public support was declining, demobilization
and drawdown were shrinking the armed services, if not quite back to
pre-war levels. Yet Marshall recognized the threat of Soviet power and
believed the public needed to maintain its close attachment to the military in order to provide the groundwork for another mass mobilization.
In a peculiar historical echo, just as the Army pivoted from the Pacific
to the Eurasian landmass in the mid-1940s while struggling to maintain
its funding and capacities, so today it pivots from Eurasia back to the
Pacific, once again facing a public weary of war and a Congress eager for
a reduced defense budget.
If the problem in 1946 was maintaining public support with less
money, without a war to justify that support, and with only a nebulous
threat from Russia in its place, the solution to Marshall’s mind was
Universal Military Training (UMT).13 Described as “the most revolutionary proposals ever made to the American Congress,” Universal
Military Training would encompass peacetime conscription, military
training for young people, a reserve of alumni trainees and refresher
training for six years.14
The eminently practical Marshall had little taste for militarism in
the sense described by Alfred Vagts, the “vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions and thought associated with armies and wars yet
transcending true military purposes.”15 Universal Military Training
represented instead a form of militarization, as sociologist August B.
Hollingshead described military socialization in his article in an influential 1946 special issue of the American Journal of Sociolog y.16 Whereas
militarism is generally used to refer to the celebration of the pomp and
circumstance of those elements setting military life apart from the
norm, militarization refers here to the attempt to integrate a fundamental concern with military affairs into either the individual (as soldiers
are militarized through basic training) or into the general public. This
preference for broad militarization was a manifestation of Army utopianism, a set of assumptions about the nature of civil-military relations
that places the Army at the very center of social life. Army leaders
believed a high degree of militarization was both possible and attainable
at relatively little threat to the organization itself, since the public and
the media were expected to react favorably to attempts to militarize.
While Universal Military Training was an important effort by
Army leaders to militarize American society, it was not the only one.
Significantly, Army leaders of this period attempted to militarize
American society partly through the work of public affairs. Surveying
12      Adam J. Berinsky, In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to
Iraq (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009), 209.
13      John Sager, “Universal Military Training and the Struggle to Define American Identity
During the Cold War,” Federal History, 5 (2013): 57-74.
14      Charles H. Lyttle, “Review of Universal Military Training and National Security, ed. Paul
Russell Anderson,” Social Service Review 20, no. 1 (1946): 111-112.
15      Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Military and Civilian, Revised Edition (New York: The
Free Press, 1959), 13.
16      August B. Hollingshead, “Adjustment to Military Life,” American Journal of Sociology 51, no.
5 (1946): 439-447.
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the developments in Army public affairs in the early Cold War period,
there is a rich sense of how Army utopianism was integrated into the
Army’s basic messaging with the public. Messaging in general and public
affairs in particular were accordingly championed by several top Army
leaders in this period, reversing the trend set during World War I, when
the Creel Committee (the first major US military effort to shape public
opinion) was disbanded and its organizational developments lost.17
Shortly after the war, two reports were submitted to the Army’s top
leadership underscoring the centrality of messaging activities to military
success; these helped trigger the relative rise of public affairs. The Page
Report of 1945, recognizing the low prestige of the field, called for a
high-ranking officer to lead the new Army public affairs department
replacing the World War II-era Bureau of Public Relations. The Army
obliged by naming J. Lawton Collins the first Director of Information.
Collins was a rising star and would become the chief of staff four years
later. His appointment was a clear vote of confidence. Working alongside Collins and his office was the Public Relations Division, headed by
Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, another experienced and respected officer.18
Under Collins and Parks, the new departments commissioned the
Lockhart Report (1946), which advocated the centrality of the Bureau
of Public Relations to the Army and the importance of aligning public
relations activities with Army goals, “so as to gain maximum public
benefit”.19 What precisely this meant was spelled out to the corps of
information officers by Parks in an issue of Army Information Digest, in
August of 1946. Parks noted, “every action dealing with the media of
public relations, should be calculated to advance the purpose of the
Army as a whole toward the larger objective.”20 He followed with a
four-paragraph “Creed of Army Public Relations,” which stressed the
transparency of Army information and its “public utility function”. A
tension within Parks’ article is evident today: how could one expect
information officers to conceive of their role as both active instrument
of Army command and as passive public utility? At any rate, few would
have mistaken Parks’s own clear preference of the former over the latter.
These early documents suggest strongly the belief that if the Army is to
exist within the broader society, it must pursue its objectives partly by
shaping that society.
An indication of what such a process might require can be found in
an obscure report by two junior officers, Sidle and Notestein, working at
the Presidio in San Francisco for the Sixth Army.21 Sidle and Notestein
presented the report to Maj. Gen. Milton B. Halsky (who signed it) for
distribution among Professors of Military Science and Tactics, Senior
and Junior Division Reserve Officer Training Corps (Sixth Army
17      Kennon H. Nakamura and Matthew C. Weed, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and Current
Issues, CRS Report R40989 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
December 18, 2009), 14.
18      Both departments would move through a quick succession of name changes, but would
eventually be known as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (Collins’s job), and Army
Chief of Public Affairs (Parks’s job).
19      Sidney Alvin Knutson, History of the Public Relations Program in the United States Army (M.Sc.
Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1953), 322.
20      Major General Floyd L. Parks, “A Creed for Army Public Relations,” Army Information Digest
(August 1946): 3-7.
21      Their ranks are not listed, and nor is Notestein’s first name. Sidle was Winant Sidle, who
would go on to a distinguished career in Army public affairs and retire at the rank of Major General.
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Area). These were, in other words, professors at colleges with an ROTC
program who ran summer camps in the San Francisco area. The nine
page report spelled out eleven points of advice for tailoring a sequence
of news releases to promote each camp. The instructors were encouraged to prepare biographical cards for each cadet; write a release for
the cadet’s home town newspapers and school publications; take an
effective headshot of each cadet; and tailor a final release to the same
publications once the camp finished. More general suggestions included
building relations with media in the vicinity of the camp by encouraging
press tours and open houses. The authors of the report noted the stories
should be based around each camper’s expectation of being offered a
commission, which was viewed as something worth boasting. All of
this media work was intended to promote ROTC training programs
as valuable to national security, and so “gag” or humorous stories were
strongly discouraged.22
It is difficult to imagine an era of journalism where ROTC training
might conceivably give rise to dozens, if not hundreds, of stories spread
across local media outlets, summer after summer. The plan, however,
was clearly given serious consideration, as a note on the archival copy
indicates: “CINFO [Chief of Information, Parks’s successor] is sending
out to all CONUS [Contiguous United States] Armies.”23 The SidleNotestein report reflects a spirit of immense enthusiasm and confidence
in the capabilities of the Army in actively engaging with press in an overt
quest to shape public opinion. This optimistic assessment, their version
of Army utopianism, suggests a near-perfect synthesis of military and
public interest and a press compliant enough to allow the Army to use
it as a mere conduit. Of course, it is unclear how journalists would have
reacted to this attempt at shaping their work; it is possible that they
would have refused to take the bait. There is also no cause to view this
as a sinister or even disingenuous scheme. Rather, it may well simply
reflect the great optimism of the report’s authors as well as of the Chief
of Information.
In retrospect, this optimism may seem out of step with the immediate post-war period, when both militarism (in Vagts’s sense) and
government propaganda had finally lost their luster. Elmer Davis’s
Office of War Information and the Office of Censorship both closed
in 1945, with significant Congressional pressure acting on the former.
The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 outlawed domestic propaganda, a major
blow to Office of War Information’s successor, the new United States
Information Agency (USIA). However, what might today look like moral
stances taken against the corruption of the democratic process were
at the time more like partisan squabbles, the concern being domestic
propaganda would be used by one party against the other. Similarly,
many Army leaders still believed George Marshall’s vision of Universal
Military Training may yet come to pass. So while militarism may have
been out of season, it was being replaced by a more sophisticated form
of militarization. This transition in turn was predicated on a rather
22      It is of course not clear whether this attempt to shape news coverage would have had any
effect on editors and reporters.
23      Suggested Public Informational Activities for PMS&Ts, Sixth Army Area, 3 April 1951;
Winant Sidle Papers, 1950-1999, Box 2, Folder 4, Miscellaneous Correspondence re. PA; United
States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

Civil-Military Relations & Military Ethics

Crosbie

111

optimistic assessment of the press’s willingness to serve as a conduit
for military messaging and of the public’s appetite for being militarized.
In this context, the Sidle-Notestein report draws from a similar
well as other utopian articulations of public information policy.24 On
June 4, 1954, for example, Collins’s successor as Chief of Staff, General
Matthew B. Ridgway, echoed the Page Report of 1945 and reaffirmed
the spirit of Parks’s Creed in a letter to all major commanders in the
Army, which essentially observed the importance of public affairs for
Army life. However, he also focused his comments on an issue at the
heart of the Sidle-Notestein report, namely the equal importance of
troop morale and local media relations to national media management
efforts. According to Ridgway, “Only by doing all these things thoroughly shall we be able to gain and retain the confidence and support
of the American people.”25 This was not an idle concern on Ridgway’s
part. A few months earlier, on February 8, 1954, he had “disturbed” the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with critical words to the House
Subcommittee on the Armed Services, and particularly his concern
the Army would lose too much manpower with the New Look cuts.26
Speaking before Congress was one way to pressure Secretary of Defense
Charles Wilson and President Eisenhower; messaging to the public was
another.
By 1956 there had been several important votes of confidence in
Army public affairs, and a new understanding was emerging concerning
just how extensive Army efforts in this regard could be. Most significantly, perhaps, was in their successive turns as the nation’s top soldier,
Collins and Ridgway both signaled the importance of the field. At this
crucial period of post-war Army reorganization, top leadership support
would have been instrumental in allowing the two Army public affairs
offices (now called the Office of Public Information and the Office of
the Chief of Information and Education) to continue their evolution. To
this end, under the incoming chief of staff, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, three
Office of the Chief of Information and Education officers undertook a
vast analysis of all Army public affairs functions in order to develop a
systematic approach for the Army’s political strategy. The internal goal
of the report was to coordinate what had thus far been four discrete
fields of public affairs work: public information (engaging with national
media), troop information (informing, entertaining and indoctrinating
soldiers), troop education (courses and training for troops) and community relations (engaging with regional media and local governance).
The plan, reviewed by the now-retired Parks, was innocuously titled
“An Army Public Relations Plan,” but in fact was a 250-page, 50-point

24      Although the terms are at times confusing, “public information” and “public affairs” must
be distinguished from one another. Public affairs is the broader category, including not only public
information (liaising with the press) but also community relations (liaising with local civilians) and
command information (liaising with the troops).
25      “An Army Public Relations Plan,” March 7 1956, 216; Chief of Information, Programs
Branch, Correspondence, Information Officers’ Conference (1959-60), Box 5; Army Staff – Record
Group 319; National Archives, College Park, MD.
26      Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61 (New York: Macmillan,
1996), 57.

112

Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15

discussion of how to transform Army public affairs into “aggressive
public relations.”27
The tenor of this plan can be gauged in an introductory section
which describes the Army’s audiences. Three are identified: the general
public, troops, and Congress. But in the discussion that follows, these
three are revealed to be in turn composed of multiple, distinct groups
that require separate public relations strategies. Thirty groups in all are
singled out as requiring special care, including the press, viewed as both
audience and conduit; youth organizations; local chapters of national
organizations; female members of Congress; veterans of other services;
and many more. Notably, foreign publics, whether those of allies or
enemies, were ignored entirely: the goal of Army public relations was to
shape domestic and internal audiences.28
The spirit of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which prohibited
domestic propaganda, would have been sorely tested by this plan. It
included extensive discussion of slogans, marketing gimmicks (e.g. work
with Zippo, Hallmark, Revlon and toy manufacturers), major public
events and other obvious efforts to persuade the American public of
the Army’s merits. The plan was also pointedly oriented to the internal
public of troops (with multiple subdivisions, of course), but there was
an important conceptual development. The plan reversed traditional
notions of troop information as concerned primarily with maintaining morale. Instead, troops are viewed much as the press is: both are
audiences that need to be persuaded of the Army’s message but also conduits through which that message can be spread. In other words, troop
information and education were intended to help encourage soldiers to
spread positive messages about the Army to their civilian friends and
family members, in effect to proselytize for the Army.
In an era of mass conscription, when Universal Military Training
was still an Army goal, the utopian spirit of this expansive report is a
reflection of a buoyant institution. However, there is no record of the fate
of the report, which reflects the more mundane reality of Army fortunes.
Post-war drawdown was sapping resources. Overt propagandizing was
also coming under attack once again. On May 15, 1957, United States
Information Agency (USIA) Chief Arthur V. Larson came under intense
questioning by Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson. The USIA’s budget was reduced
by $20 million, a major blow to the USIA, partly on the grounds that
Larson, in Johnson’s estimation, had “stepped over the line” and begun
using the USIA to support Republican Party interests.29 For the Army’s
part, the Office of the Chief of Information and Education’s budget had
been steadily declining even as the rhetoric of its value to the Army was
heating up. In fiscal year 1952, its budget was $3,225,482, but in the year
of the plan, the budget was only $832,000—authors refer to this number
as “totally inadequate, completely unrealistic, artificial.”30 Even if the
plan was not ultimately passed, it remains a significant attempt to reas27      A fourth element, troop education (job training for soldiers), was at that time housed in
Office of the Chief of Information and Education, but was soon removed and did not feature in
the 1956 plan.
28      “Army Public Relations Plan,” 7.
29      Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson, TX, “State, Justice and Judiciary Appropriations, 1958,” Congressional
Record 103 (May 15, 1957): 6968.
30      Army Public Relations Plan, 66.
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sert the importance of the field to the Army, and in turn the centrality
of the Army to the nation.

Justifying Conventional Force in a Nuclear Age

It is not surprising that Army leaders felt their institution, which
had performed so admirably in the war, would remain a highly visible
and familiar component of the state. But this line of reasoning intersected disastrously with the grand strategic vision of civilian authorities,
especially the incoming president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his New
Look policies. Eisenhower’s preference for a slimmer Army supplementing the deterrence of nuclear weapons had the effect of challenging the
Army’s monopoly on conventional force, which was going out of style,
and the Army—with its hopes of vast social influence—was faced with
justifying its continued relevance.
At this time, military strategy was still coming to terms with the
new place of civilians in war. Some strands of nuclear deterrence strategy posited large civilian populations as the inevitable target of Soviet
aggression. That conceptual shift corresponded to a reimagining of
conventional Army strength as a vestigial organ of state power, most
powerfully exemplified by Eisenhower’s New Look. Army leaders
attempted to reassert the importance of the full spectrum of Army
resources, justifying both conventional and irregular units as important
front-line elements in the Cold War, which was in contrast to the New
Look’s preference for long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. These
justifications hinged on making the case that limited wars could still be
fought without tipping over into full-out nuclear war.
Army utopianism as a political strategy would eventually crash
against the realities of American involvement in Vietnam, but at first
the region must have looked like a tempting showcase for the continuing relevance of the service’s unique capabilities in ground warfare.
American involvement in the region consolidated in November 1955,
with the creation of Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
(commonly referred to as MAAG). This was part of a broader Cold
War configuration of such groups. MAAG (Vietnam version) replaced
the Indochina advisory group, and worked alongside similar groups in
Cambodia and Laos. These groups were headed by military officers but
were ultimately part of country teams that were headed by ambassadors,
although a separate chain of command put the advisory groups under
the commander in chief of American military forces in the Pacific. More
simply put, during the MAAG era, the American presence in Vietnam
was led by diplomats who worked closely with military leaders.
The MAAG era was characterized by extensive, if not entirely successful, efforts to modernize and train the South Vietnamese military
services. The effort was undermined by Ngo Dihn Diem, head of the
South Vietnamese state, who carefully ensured top Vietnamese officers
were never so competent as to challenge his rule. This was supplemented by CIA operations.31 By 1961, Diem’s military capacity was
deemed insufficient for repelling anticipated forays from the North.
Something would have to be done. At first, the Kennedy administration
31      Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency (Lexington, KY:
University of Kentucky Press, 2010).
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stood by a counterinsurgency plan that would involve MAAG shifting
emphasis toward a pacification logic, which involved both coercion and
nation-building tasks. The concept was approved but it was understood
that it would be implemented by South Vietnamese soldiers, supervised
by American soldiers, and aided by both the Army’s Special Forces (the
Green Berets) and CIA personnel.32 A further complication, the Army
had only vague notions of what countering insurgent or guerilla forces
might actually entail, and according to Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, then
Chief of Staff, the training actually conducted at MACV was, as late as
March, 1960, fundamentally conventional.33
Lemnitzer had replaced Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who had been Chief of
Staff when the utopian public relations plan was written. Taylor occupied
an unusual role. After his retirement as chief of staff, he had campaigned
publicly against President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s New Look, particularly its orientation to massive retaliation as the key geopolitical pivot
in a nuclear age. In 1959, he published a book advocating an alternative
doctrine of “flexible response.”34 Taylor reflected a conventional force
sensibility in his resistance to the New Look doctrine, which he argued
was premised on the “Great Fallacy” that the threat of nuclear weapons
would prevent war. In Taylor’s words, “while our massive retaliatory
strategy may have prevented the Great War—a World War III—it has
not maintained the Little Peace.”35
Eisenhower’s plan relied on nuclear deterrence and market tools to
realize American interests abroad, and Eisenhower himself was happy
to get his country out of the business of war fighting. In the words of
one historian, to Eisenhower’s mind, “war was no longer an acceptable means to achieve political objectives. The military’s foremost and,
perhaps, only mission was to deter it.”36 An added benefit was that once
modernized, the Department of Defense could begin accruing savings
by cutting “frills” and make do with a “leaner and tougher” budget in
Eisenhower’s words.37 It all hinged on one big question: would nuclear
weapons prevent limited wars from being fought due to the risk of triggering what was then termed “general war,” a third, nuclear world war?
In contrast to Air Force and some Navy leaders, Army leaders rejected
this notion and anticipated instead a broad space for what was in essence
conventional warfare brinkmanship.38
The Army’s perspective can be gleaned in speeches by top soldiers
during this period. On April 6, 1960, Lemnitzer spoke of Soviet expectations of a long nuclear war, one that might start with the exchange
of devastating nuclear attacks on civilian populations but would still

32      David Hunt, “Dirty Wars: Counterinsurgency in Vietnam and Today,” Politics and Society 38,
no. 1 (2010): 35-66.
33      David M. Toczek, The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything But Learn (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 33.
34      Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 2007); see also Donald Alan
Carter, “Eisenhower versus the Generals,” Journal of Military History 72, no. 4 (2007): 1169-1199.
35      Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 6.
36      Carter, “Eisenhower versus the Generals,” 1175.
37      As it turned out, this was not a cheaper option, since the arms race quickly drove the cost
of strategic deterrence to unexpected heights. See Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look, 259, 262, 271.
38      Carter, “Eisenhower versus the Generals,” 1181.
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require conventional forces fighting on land to decide the issue.39 This
nightmarish vision was expanded in another talk in August, where
Lemnitzer connected the long nuclear war scenario to the resulting
decrease in the efficacy of deterrence. Nuclear war was not considered
by American enemies as a decisive event, and so nuclear power was not
decisive. Indeed, Lemnitzer informed his audience that Soviet forces
might launch a nuclear attack on American soil simply to gain territory
somewhere else. Accordingly, there should be no question of restraint
when it came to conventional involvement in seemingly remote theaters;
rather, a blend of US forces was needed that could go into any given area
and “exterminate the rats without destroying the neighborhood.”40
Lemnitzer was echoed by his successor, Gen. George H. Decker,
who spoke before an audience in New York on March 25, 1961 on the
subject of “The Army Today.” His comments supported Kennedy’s
preferred orientation to counterinsurgency, while hedging for the
importance of maintaining conventional force. He noted, strategy in
this complex time “must be a flexible, pragmatic combination of all
these [maritime, aerospace and landmass power], considered in context
with political, economic, and other non-military factors.”41
The struggle to preserve Army conventional force would continue
throughout the period. Three weeks after Decker’s speech, Lemnitzer,
now the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded to a request from
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara to provide joint doctrine that
would minimize conventional force in a nuclear war, emphasizing instead
diplomatic solutions through the use of less force and scheduled breaks
in fighting. Lemnitzer’s response was in effect to reject McNamara’s
order, noting,
we do not have adequate defenses, nor are our nuclear retaliatory forces
sufficiently invulnerable, to permit us to risk withholding a substantial part
of our effort, once a major thermonuclear attack has been initiated… such a
doctrine, or to declare such an intent, would be premature and could gravely
weaken our deterrent posture.42

Decker and Lemnitzer were risking their positions when they
pushed back against McNamara, who had President Kennedy’s support,
but they did so because they believed the Army’s monopoly on conventional ground forces retained its central place in legitimating American
foreign policy, even in the nuclear age.
During the presidential campaign, Kennedy had championed
Maxwell Taylor’s doctrine in particular and called him out of retirement to investigate the Bay of Pigs incident. Accordingly, Taylor, along
with Walter W. Rostow, was sent by Kennedy to review the situation in Vietnam. In November 1961, Taylor and Rostow offered the
39      Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Address to the National Association of State and Territorial Civil
Defense Directors, 6 April 1960, Box 1, Folder 1, Lyman L. Lemnitzer Papers, 1960-1990, United
States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
40      Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Address to Association of the United States Army, 9 August
1960, Box 1, Folder 1, Lyman L. Lemnitzer Papers, 1960-1990, United States Army Heritage and
Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
41      Gen. George H. Decker, The Army Today – Address to the Calvin Bullock Forum, 23 March
1961, Box 6, Folder 2, George H. Decker Papers, 1959-1962, United States Army Heritage and
Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
42      Fred M. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), 273.
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fateful call for a “massive joint effort” to guarantee South Vietnamese
freedom. Against the backdrop of Lemnitzer’s and Decker’s thoughts
on aggressive postures, and Taylor’s own notions of flexible response,
this decision was bred of confidence in the ability of the US Army to
secure large-scale geopolitical ends. At any rate, the proposal included
8,000 American ground troops.43 Kennedy balked at the troop request,
but approved a scaled-down version of the plan which still signified
such a significant increase in the American role that a new headquarters
would be needed.44 With this force, the Army’s top leaders began the
difficult task of learning counterinsurgency while also establishing a
conventional force presence. Twelve years later, the Army would finally
withdraw from the region, its relations with the public in a state of crisis.

Conclusion

Since World War II, the place of the Army in American politics
has undergone a dramatic transformation. At first, top Army leaders
anticipated they would retain a central role in public life and looked
to journalists, then working under voluntary conditions of access and
recently freed from censorship, to help the Army tell its story. Most
importantly for many top Army officers (including a series of chiefs of
staff), the Army had to justify its continuing monopoly on conventional
ground forces. This had been directly challenged by other services and
governmental branches, but was also indirectly challenged by a new
emphasis on strategic deterrence (led by diplomats and backed by nuclear
weapons). Accordingly, at the beginning of American involvement in
Vietnam, the Army focused on conventional force displays and anticipated that press coverage would rally support behind the organization.
As the Army became increasingly entangled in Vietnam, the
impulse to justify conventional force became more pronounced, and
counterinsurgency fell by the wayside. In Gen. William Westmoreland,
the American forces found a leader dedicated to persistently optimistic
messaging and to conventional force. While Army utopianism certainly
cannot explain every element of the thinking of the top Army commanders of this period, it provides a pathway to understanding the
domestic political attitudes informing military strategic preferences. If
the Army was to be a major component of American society, then it had
to prove the enduring value of its core competency, conventional ground
war. Both the reliance on conventional force and the utopian vision of
the Army would decline as the American body count drew increasing
public ire. Eventually, Vietnamization (shedding the Army’s command
responsibility), matched with strategic bombing (which supplanted conventional force), would allow the Army to withdraw from what would
become an extremely damaging conflict politically.
Today, the Army’s leaders are faced with two challenges: first, to
preserve the lessons gained from the Global War on Terror despite the
pressure to cut costs and offer a peace dividend; and second, to reorient
the Army’s posture to a new theater in the “pivot to the Pacific.” This
dilemma is not so different than the situation facing top commanders

43      Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962-1967
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006), 20.
44      Ibid., 43.
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following the end of World War II, when a far more dramatic drawdown
was paired with a pivot to the Eurasian landmass. In this case, looking
closely at the past can provide direct lessons for the present.
In both time periods, the link between the political and operational realities is provided in part through domestic political strategy.
In the words of Russell F. Weigley, one of the foremost historians of
the Army, “To use—and restrain—its immense social, economic, and
political influence wisely and effectively, the Army must obviously hold
itself in close rapport with the people.”45 Some Army leaders in the
post-World War II period quite reasonably pursued a strategy of close
rapport defined here as Army utopianism, which today can be seen as a
gross miscalculation of the direction of the broader American political
culture. This revealed the relationship Weigley sketches between “influence” and “rapport” is not straightforward, and simply amplifying the
Army’s presence in American public life can have the opposite of the
intended effect.

Lessons/Insights

Accordingly, the first lesson of this historical case study is simply to
guard against the optimistic and expansive vision of the Army’s role of
which Army utopianism is just the most extreme expression.
Another lesson is operational strategy. It is (and has long been) “sold”
to the public, and this should be acknowledged as both a fact of life and
as an operational concern of the first order. All the armed services are
required to liaise with state and society across multiple platforms, and
will inevitably pursue more beneficial outcomes to some degree when
doing so, and this is especially the case when addressing the core competencies of the given service. By the same token, the political calculus can
interfere disastrously with operational planning. The Army’s domestic
political strategy is not an epiphenomenon, but rather an intrinsic component of operations and one demanding serious attention and study.46
A third lesson, related to the second, can be drawn specifically for
practitioners of information operations and strategic communication. In
these fields, there have been long-standing failures to create comprehensive and wide-ranging strategic plans, attributed in part to competition
between the agencies charged with these tasks.47 The case of Army utopianism reminds that such failures have long dogged the services and
may have deep cultural roots. In other words, these may be even less
tractable problems than is currently thought. On one hand, recognizing
the historical and cultural horizon of messaging problems is a first step
in resolving them. On the other hand, and as Steven Tatham has pointed
out in the cases of China and Russia, competitor states have already
found workable solutions to these problems, and so there is real value
in investing the Army’s limited resources in this field.48 Concretely, to
45    Weigley, History of the United States Army, 556.
46      A similar point is made by Braun and Allen, “Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy:
Reconciling Military Roles.”
47     Hans F. Palaoro, “Information Strategy: The Missing Link,” Joint Force Quarterly 59, no. 4
(2010): 83-85.
48     Steve Tatham, US Government Information Operations and Strategic Communications: A Discredited
Tool or User Failure? Implications for Future Conflict (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press,
Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), 46-57.
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better conduct information and messaging activities, the Army should
extensively research the blinding effects of its own cultural traditions,
recognizing both the contingency and the stickiness of organizational
culture.
These lessons can be implemented. It is certainly possible for
the Army to guard against a tendency toward exaggerating its role in
American social life (lesson 1). Likewise, it is possible to nurture a
leadership cadre attentive to its domestic political standing and how it
intersects with operational capacities (lesson 2) and how these in turn
inform its foreign and domestic messaging (lesson 3).
And so, while the case study is intended to make clear how much the
Army’s culture has shaped its operational strategy, the ulterior motive is
to enable the opposite outcome, the strategic shaping of Army culture
itself. To this end, a fourth and final lesson can be drawn concerning
the Army’s characteristic commitment to conventional force. As in the
Cold War, so today the Army navigates between Scylla and Charybdis,
on one hand doubling down on its core competencies and potentially
blinding itself to much-needed reform, and on the other hand leaping
without looking at promising solutions while eroding its identity in the
meantime. Between these twin dangers lies the narrow field open to
the Army, a field requiring multiple competencies and a close, dialogic
rapport with its increasingly global public.

